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ABSTRACT 
The 1990's dealt a blow to traditional Heckscher-Ohlin analysis of the relationship between trade and 
income inequality, as it became clear that rising inequality in low- income countries and other features of 
the data were inconsistent with that model. As a result, economists moved away from trade as a plausible 
explanation for rising income inequality. In recent years, however, a number of new mechanisms have 
been explored through which trade can affect (and usually increase) income inequality. These include 
within-industry effects due to heterogeneous firms; effects of offshoring of tasks; effects on incomplete 
contracting; and effects of labor-market frictions. A number of these mechanisms have received 
substantial empirical support. 
Keywords:  trade inequality 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most robust trends in the last three decades of the twentieth century has been a rise in within-
country inequality in a wide range of countries. This rise in inequality—whether measured in income, 
wages, wage premia, or assets—has been observed in both the developed and developing worlds. Within 
the United States, Latin America, Asia, and Africa the gap between individuals has widened considerably. 
One plausible explanation for this increasing inequality is the rise in globalization. Whether 
measured in trade flows, tariffs, capital flows, or offshoring, globalization has increased markedly in both 
developed and developing countries. Trade between developed and developing countries has increased 
substantially, and poles of growth have shifted to the developing world. These parallel developments have 
naturally led to speculation that the increase in inequality is a result of increased exposure to international 
trade. Until the 1990's, the leading framework for understand the possible link between trade and 
inequality was the Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) model, which, in its simple form, predicts that countries export 
goods that use intensively the factor with which they are most abundantly supplied. One implication of 
this framework is that trade increases the real return to the factor that is relatively abundant in each 
country and lowers the real return to the other factor - known as the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. This 
means that in developed countries, with an abundance of skilled labor, wages of skilled workers should 
increase relative to unskilled workers and inequality should rise with trade. The opposite was expected to 
happen in developing countries that were well-endowed with unskilled labor: inequality should have 
declined with trade. 
A number of studies published between 1990 and 2010 dealt a serious blow to this theory by 
documenting an increase in inequality in developing countries that frequently paralleled major trade 
reforms. Countries exhibiting this trend include Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, and 
China (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007a, 2007b), Topalova (2007), Harrison and Hanson (1999) and 
others). While the evidence providing a direct link between trade reforms and rising inequality is 
available only for some countries (such as India and Mexico), the preponderance of the evidence of rising 
inequality in developing countries in a period of rapid globalization is nevertheless at odds with the 
simple predictions of the HO framework. An additional problem for the HO theory has been widespread 
evidence of within-industry increases in demand for skilled workers (Lawrence and Slaughter (1993)). 
For example, both inequality and the demand for skilled workers have increased in the services sector of 
the US where, prior to the 1990s, there was almost no international trade or offshore activity. 
These findings led many economists to drop trade as a candidate for explaining rising inequality 
and look for other factors. One leading explanation for trends in inequality is skill- biased technological 
change, which means changes in technology (such as the increasing use of computers) that increase the 
demand for skilled workers. Other factors that have been cited by economists include the weakening of 
labor market institutions such as unions and the declining real value of minimum wages, differential 
access to schooling, and immigration. Overall, for a substantial period of time, most labor and trade 
economists were skeptical of assigning too great an importance to trade-based explanations for the 
increase in inequality. 
That may be changing. The emergence of stylized facts at odds with existing trade theory has led 
to new theoretical developments focusing on heterogeneous firms and bargaining, trade in tasks, labor 
market frictions, and incomplete contracts. These new theories provide insights into the effects of trade on 
income and wage inequality. This more recent literature, which has emerged in the last decade, is the 
focus of our essay. We shall see that there are now a number of ways to explain how trade could 
contribute to rising within-industry inequality as well as rising inequality in countries at all income levels. 
However, the empirical literature has not kept pace with the theoretical developments, in part because 
they are so new. Researchers will need to sort through these different theories to identify which are most 
consistent with the data. 
For the purpose of this review, trade is broadly defined to include trade in goods and services and 
foreign direct investment. Much has been written about how to define inequality and we do not have the 2 
space to go into those details here. For our purposes it is sufficient to note two important facts. First, 
income based measures of inequality are subject to all of the same caveats as income based measures of 
poverty. See Deaton (2005) for a review of these issues. Second, this review focuses only on inequality 
within countries as measured by income and wages; it does not focus on inequality across countries. For 
discussions of trends in inequality across countries - global inequality - the interested reader is referred to 
Ravallion (2001, 2003), Milanovic (2005), and Sala-i-Martin (2002). 
The rest of this review is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature on 
trade and inequality beginning with the older literature but emphasizing the new developments that are 
more consistent with recent empirical evidence. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature on trade and 
inequality again beginning with the older literature but emphasizing recent work using new datasets and 
innovative approaches. 3 
2.  THEORY 
2.1. Brief Synopsis of Earlier Work 
First, we present a whirlwind synopsis of the theory of trade and income inequality before 2003. 
Following that, we launch into more recent work. The mainspring of theory behind empirical work on 
trade and distribution in the 1990's was the classic comparative-advantage framework. In particular, the 
distinction between distributive effects in a Heckscher-Ohlin model and in specific factors models was a 
key focus. 
In a Heckscher-Ohlin model, each factor of production is able to move costlessly between 
industries (but not across countries). As a result, each factor earns the same income no matter what 
industry employs it, and trade affects income inequality by changing the prices of factors. In a two-factor 
version of the model, this means that trade increases the real return to the factor that is relatively abundant 
in each country and lowers the real return to the other factor - the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. If the two 
factors are skilled and unskilled labor, that means that trade increases income inequality in rich countries 
(by raising the real return to abundant skilled labor and lowering the return to scarce unskilled labor) and 
lowers income inequality in poor countries. In many-factor models, trade on average raises the prices of 
factors that are more abundant in each country relative to less abundant factors (see Deardorff (1982) for 
a general treatment). 
By contrast, in a specific-factors model, one or more factors of production cannot change 
industries at all. As a result, trade tends to lower the real incomes of factors in import- competing 
industries and raise those in export industries (Jones (1971) is a classic reference). For example, if human 
capital is industry specific, trade will raise the incomes of workers in exporting industries at the expense 
of workers in import-competing industries. As a result, trade will increase income inequality if export-
sector workers tend to have higher wages, and reduce it otherwise. 
Applied economists over the years have noted problems with both of these simple approaches, 
and particularly the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, as a guide to the income-inequaity effects of trade. For 
example, Harrison and McMillan (2007) collect a number of the more important ones, including the 
likelihood that different countries produce different goods (which invalidates the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem) and the presence of labor market frictions. Accordingly, a number of important qualifications 
have been added to this basic framework.  
(i)  Trade in tasks. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) study a model of offshoring, or the practice by 
which a firm producing in one country allocates some tasks to workers in another country.1
                                                       
1 In the popular press, this is often called 'outsourcing,' but we will follow the usage of the research literature in calling it 
'offshoring,' to distinguish it from outsourcing in Industrial Organization. 
 
In their model, a single good is produced by a competitive industry, with each firm hiring 
skilled and unskilled workers to perform a continuum of tasks. The tasks can be ranked on the 
basis of their skill intensity, and a complete set of tasks must be combined with capital to 
produce output. There are two countries, with different relative supplies of skilled and 
unskilled workers. Since skilled workers are relatively inexpensive in the skill-rich country, 
cost minimization calls for each firm to choose a cutoff task, allocating tasks more skill- 
intensive than that task to workers in the skill-rich country and less skill-intensive tasks to 
workers in the skill-poor country. In other words, if we think of the firms as headquartered in 
the skill-rich country, then they offshore less skill-intensive tasks to the skill-poor country 
(or, equivalently, the skill-rich country imports unskilled-intensive tasks from the skill-poor 
country). Now, if the environment changes so that it becomes easier to offshore (modelled by 
Feenstra and Hanson as a movement of capital from skill-rich to skill poor country), the 
initial cutoff task is replaced by a new cutoff task that is more unskilled intensive. Thus, a 
range of tasks are moved from the skill-rich country to the skill-poor country. Since the tasks 
thus reallocated are the least skill-intensive that were being performed in the skill rich 4 
country, but are more skill intensive than the tasks initially done in the skill-poor country, the 
result is that labor demand becomes more skill-intensive in both countries at the same time. 
Consequently, the equilibrium skill premium rises in both countries. Recall that the simple 
Heckscher-Ohlin model predicted that trade in goods would raise income inequality in rich 
countries but lower it in poor ones. By contrast, the Feenstra-Hanson offshoring model 
predicts that trade in tasks will raise income inequality in both countries. This is a striking 
result, not least because of abundant empirical work suggesting a rise in income inequality 
accompanying trade liberalization in countries across the income spectrum in the 1980's.
2
(ii) Search frictions and unemployment. Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) incorporate worker 
search frictions and unemployment into a standard trade model, showing that such frictions can 
lead to a substantive revision of the distributional effects of trade. For example, the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem does not extend to an environment of that sort when formulated as a 
statement about the incomes of employed factors, but it does extend to such an environment 
when formulated as a statement about the expected lifetime income of searching factors. A wide 
range of effects of search frictions on labor-market outcomes in trade models are gathered in 
Davidson and Matusz (2009). 
 
(iii) Trade and innovation. A small cluster of theoretical work shows that innovation can be an 
important channel through which trade affects income distribution, in ways that are very different 
from a comparative advantage approach. For example, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) study a 
two-country growth model with a continuum of industries, in each of which firms compete 
through research and development (R&D) for technological supremacy. In each industry, the firm 
with the best technology captures the entire market, but its price is limited by the marginal cost of 
the next-best available technology. At any moment, a large number of firms conduct R&D to 
obtain a breakthrough and become the new leader. Each country exports the products for which 
the industry leader happens to be, at the moment, one of its domestic firms, and each country 
initially maintains a uniform tariff against anything its consumers might import from the other 
country. The tariffs cut into the market leader's profit margins, reducing the jackpot that results 
from being the market leader, and thus reducing the incentive for any firm to do R&D to become 
the market leader. As a result, trade liberalization increases R&D, and growth, in both countries. 
Now, to the point about income inequality: If R&D is skilled-labor intensive relative to 
manufacturing, given its reliance on scientists and engineers, then trade liberalization will raise 
the relative demand for skilled labor in both countries, increasing income inequality all around. A 
related approach is provided by Neary (2003, section 9), in which two identical countries with a 
large number of Cournot oligopolies open to trade. Each oligopolist now has an incentive to do 
R&D to lower its marginal cost and obtain an advantage over its foreign competitor, resulting, 
once again, in a rise in skill-intensive R&D spending and a rise in income inequality. Note that 
these R&D-based theories can be characterized as income-inequality effects of North-North trade, 
while both Heckscher-Ohlin and Feenstra-Hanson approaches are based on North-South trade. 
Now we turn to more recent developments in the theory. 
   
                                                       
2Zhu and Trefler (2005) show that the Feenstra and Hanson insight can apply in a model with only goods trade. If North has a 
comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods and technological progress allows South to grow relative to the North, then a 
range of the North's least skill-intensive goods will shift to the South, where they will become the most skill-intensive goods, 
raising skill premia in both regions. Matsuyama (2007) shows that similar effects can be obtained in a model in which transport 
costs are modelled as a separate sector, which uses skilled and unskilled labor and is skilled-labor intensive relative to goods 
production. 5 
2.2. Heterogeneous Firms and Bargaining 
An important element was introduced to trade theory by Melitz (2003), who incorporated heterogeneous-
firms monopolistic competition, following an approach pioneered in Hopenhayn (1992), into a model of 
international trade. The approach has had an effect on a wide scope of trade topics, and income inequality 
effects are no exception. 
To explore the effect of heterogeneous firms on trade and inequality, we first should review the 
features of the basic model. That model can be summarized as follows. Consumers have constant-
elasticity-of-substitution preferences over a continuum of potential products. Anyone can choose to 
become an entrepreneur by incurring a fixed cost fe, which can be interpreted as the cost of developing a 
new product. Once this has been done, the entrepreneur can produce the output, with a production 
function given by: 
  𝑞  = (l – f) φ,  (1) 
where l is the labor employed per period and q is the output produced per period, f is a fixed labor 
requirement per period, and φ is the marginal product of labor. The fixed cost f is a constant of known 
value across firms and time, but the productivity parameter φ is a random variable, constant across time 
for any one firm but taking different values from one firm to another. Importantly, φ is something that the 
entrepreneur can learn only after incurring the fixed cost fe. As a result, a certain fraction of entrepreneurs 
exit the market as soon as they have put their toe in the water, because their realization of φ  is too low for 
them to be able to break even given the fixed production cost f. 
In autarky, equilibrium is determined by two values: the number of firms entering and paying fe, 
and a cutoff productivity φ𝑎
∗ for staying.  These two variables need to take values such that two conditions 
hold. First, the "zero cutoff profit" condition requires that variable profits for a firm with productivity 
parameter exactly equal to φ𝑎
∗ are equal to f, so that any firm with a realization φ < φ𝑎
∗ will exit, and any 
firm with a realization φ > φ𝑎
∗ will stay in the industry and make positive profits. Second, the "free-entry 
condition" requires that expected profits net of f for any entrant who has not yet learned her value of φ are 
equal to fe, taking into account the possibility that the firm will choose to exit right away. This ensures 
that entrepreneurs' ex ante profits are equal to zero. 
In the open-economy version of the model, there are n + 1 identical countries, and any firm can 
export to any of them by paying a fixed cost fex. In addition, there is an 'iceberg' transport cost, meaning 
that a fraction of any shipment is lost in transit. Due to the fixed cost of exporting, it is not worthwhile to 
export a small amount of any product, and so only highly productive firms export at all. Therefore, 
equilibrium is characterized not only by a number of entrepreneurs entering and a cutoff productivity 
level for staying, but also by a cutoff productivity level for exporting. Denote the latter two by φ* and φ𝑥
∗, 
so that a firm with φ < φ * will exit without producing anything; a firm with φ * < φ < φ𝑥
∗ will stay and 
produce but not export; and a firm with ( > φ𝑥
∗ will stay and export. A crucial finding of the model is that 
φ𝑎
∗ < φ*, so that firms that survive under trade are more productive than the firms that survive under 
autarky. A way of understanding the mechanism behind this is as follows. Suppose for the moment that 
the cutoff for firm exit and the number of firms entering do not change when trade is opened up. Now, 
each entrepreneur contemplating paying fe to create a product knows that in addition to the prospects 
available under autarky, there is the new possibility that if φ turns out to be high enough, the entrepreneur 
will also be able to earn more profit by exporting. Because of this, expected profit will now rise, and will 
now be greater than fe. Therefore, prospective entrepreneurs will see a strictly postive expected profit 
from creating a new product, and the free entry condition will be violated. If the cutoff for remaining does 
not change, this requires an increase in the number of entrepreneurs entering. But then there will be more 
competition; each firm's share of domestic demand will fall; and the variable profit of any firm that does 
not export will fall. Therefore, some marginal firms whose variable profits were close to the fixed 
production cost f will drop out; in other words,φ < φ𝑎
∗. 6 
Therefore, free trade raises productivity. Now, nothing in this argument has anything per se to do 
with income inequality. The labor market is frictionless and all workers are identical, so all workers 
receive the same wage. The only possibility for income inequality is in profits, since different firms earn 
different levels of profits ex post, but in a model with only risk-neutral individuals and no modelled 
financial market, the same equilibrium would be obtained if either (i) firms are self-financed by 
entrepreneurs out of wage earnings, so that each entrepreneur keeps the profit from her own project, some 
getting rich and others losing their investment completely; or (ii) start-up firms are financed by sale of 
equity, with each citizen buying shares of each start-up and receiving exactly the same share of ex post 
profits and receiving a zero rate of return on the whole portfolio. The model is not set up with a focus on 
income distribution, and so does not provide a theory of income distribution. We now turn to two 
prominent examples of models taking Melitz as a point of departure that do focus on income distribution. 
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) explore a Melitz-type model with a significant form of market 
friction: Workers care about receiving "fair wages." The underlying theory is adopted from Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990), who argued that workers' motivation to provide effort depends on the perceived 'fairness' 
of the wages they are paid, apart from any direct incentives regarding performance and shirking. This is 
one version of an efficiency wage argument, and in common with others of the genre, it features 
equilibrium unemployment in general, since even in conditions of excess labor supply an employer has an 
incentive not to lower the wage, for fear of reducing its workers' effort level. In addition, the sense of 
fairness employed here includes an assumption that workers who work at more productive and profitable 
firms feel entitled to a higher income as a result, and so this model also implies that wages will differ 
from firm to firm. Thus, this model generates wage inequality, and this inequality is affected by trade. 
The particular formulation of fairness used here makes use of a 'reference wage,' a hypothetical 
wage against which a worker compares the wage she actually receives in evaluating how 'fair' the wage is. 
For the purposes of the Egger and Kreickemeier model, the reference wage is defined, for any given 
worker, as: 
  𝜔 �(φ) = φ 𝜃[(1 - U)𝜔 �]
l-θ,  (2) 
where 𝜔 � denotes the reference wage; φ is the productivity parameter for the firm in which the employer 
works, modelled exactly as in the Melitz model above; U is the aggregate unemployment rate, 𝜔 � is the 
average wage among employed workers; and 𝜃 is a parameter, common to all workers, indicating how 
important a workers' own firm's productivity is to workers' evaluation how fair their own wages are. The 
term [(1— U) 𝜔 �] is the average income of a worker in the economy, taking account the fact that a fraction 
U are unemployed and therefore have a zero wage. A high value of 𝜃 indicates that workers in productive 
firms feel themselves entitled to high wages regardless of aggregate conditions, and this tends to lead to a 
high variance in wages across firms. Workers paid their reference wage or more put in full effort, while 
workers paid less than that reduce their effort in proportion to the shortfall in wages. Consequently, 
employers never have an incentive to pay a wage different from their workers' reference wage, and the 
reference wage acts as if it is a binding minimum wage - except that it varies from firm to firm, and it 
responds endogenously to a change in the environment as U and 𝜔 � change. 
This construction is added to the Melitz model together with an assumption that the distribution 
of the φ's is Pareto, so that the probability that φ is greater than φ' is equal to (φ
′)
-k, where k > 0 is an 
exogenous shape parameter. Parallel to the basic Melitz model, an autarky equilibrium consists of two 
variables, a productivity cutoff φ𝑎
∗ and a number of firms entering, such that (i) entrepreneurs paying fe to 
enter receive zero profits in expectation, and (ii) entrepreneurs who have entered stay if and only if their 
draw of φ is at least as high as φ𝑎
∗. The equilibrium features wages that differ from firm to firm according 
to (2), and also, in general, positive unemployment. Both of these features emerge more strongly if 𝜃 is 
high. As noted, a high value for 𝜃 implies heterogeneous wages, since workers in more productive firms 
will insist on higher wages than workers in more marginal firms. To see why a high value for 𝜃 also 
contributes to unemployment; note that if 𝜃 = 0, wage heterogeneity disappears, the reference wage 7 
becomes the average wage, and the reference wage constraint (2) collapses to a vacuous statement that 
each firm offer the representative wage. This allows the wage to fall until the labor market clears. 
Opening up the model to trade, we again have a cutoff for staying, φ
∗ > φ𝑎
∗, and a cutoff for 
exporting, φ𝑥
∗ > φ
∗. Once again, marginal firms are squeezed out by the increasing competition, and 
average productivity rises. However, now two new effects occur. First, unemployment increases. This is 
the net result of two forces working in opposite directions on the demand for labor: A rise in overall 
output, which increases demand for labor, and a rise in productivity, which decreases it. Second, the 
average real wage of employed workers rises. Third, wage inequality, as measured by the ratio of the 
average wage for employed workers to the lowest wage for employed workers, 𝜔 �/𝜔 � (φ ∗), rises. 
This last result is the key one, and it requires explanation. After all, wage inequality results from 
heterogeneity in firms, and the selection effect of trade (φ
∗ > φ𝑎
∗) that eliminates lower-productivity firms 
seems as if it should reduce that heterogeneity. Two points can help understand what drives this result. 
First, mere truncation of a distribution does not necessarily reduce the inequality in it.
3
Put differently, the way in which wage inequality is affected in this model can be described as 
follows: The ratio of the 90th percentile firm's wage to the 10th percentile firm's wage is unchanged by 
trade, but the ratio of the 90th percentile employed worker's wage to the 10th percentile worker's wage 
goes up, provided that the 90th percentile worker is employed in a firm that exports and the 10th 
percentile worker is not. The employment share of the high-wage firms has increased relative to the 
employment share of the low-wage firms. 
 In the Pareto case, 
truncation of the left tail of the distribution merely scales up the distribution, multiplying every moment 
by a common factor, and leaving every measure of inequality unchanged (this point is discussed at length 
in Helpman, Istkhoki and Redding (2010)). Consequently, the elimination of less productive firms does 
nothing to reduce inequality in the distribution of φ's. Further, note that the increased profitability of high-
productivity firms does not directly affect wage inequality either, since, by (2), the ratio between the 
wages paid at two firms is a function of the ratio between the 0's at the two firms, not their realized 
profits. On the other hand, when trade is opened, the more productive firms hire additional workers to 
serve foreign markets, while the less productive surviving firms shed workers, battered by competition 
from imports. Consequently, the average wage among the employed, w, now is more heavily weighted to 
high-wage, high-productivity firms than it was previously. This is what guarantees that the ratio of the 
average employed workers' wage to the lowest employed worker's wage rises with trade. 
When we include unemployed workers in the discussion, the finding of increased inequality due 
to trade is strengthened: The fraction of the workforce who earn zero wages goes up, even as the average 
income per worker rises. 
A related approach is explored by Davis and Harrigan (2007), who adapt a more conventional 
efficiency-wage theory to the Melitz model. They use the monitoring approach of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), in which employees can shirk on the job and need to be deterred from doing so by a threat of 
firing in the event that they are caught. In the original model, every firm was identical, and in particular 
possessed the same exogenous probability of catching a shirker in any period. In equilibrium, each firm 
charges the minimum wage required to deter shirking given the detection probability, and in the aggregate 
a positive fraction of workers must be unemployed (or else it would be impossible to deter shirking at all, 
since a shirking worker will just get a new job with another firm right away). In the Davis and Harrigan 
approach, however, firms, indexed by i, differ from each other in the marginal product of labor φi, just as 
in Melitz, but they also differ in the probability mi of detecting a shirking worker in any one period. Since 
the minimum wage required to deter shirking depends on mi, this implies that the wage paid will vary 
from firm to firm, with firms that are good at catching shirkers (high mi) paying low wages and firms that 
are bad at catching shirkers paying high wages. As a result, "good jobs" are jobs with firms that have low 
detection probabilities. Since a firm's marginal production cost is equal to the wage it must pay divided by 
                                                       
3To see a quick example, consider a random variable that takes a value of 1 with probability X, and a value of e and e
3 with 
probability (1 — X)/2 each. If X is close enough to 1, the log variance of this distribution is very close to zero, but truncating the 
distribution by eliminating the left-hand tail, in other words, eliminating the value 1, results in a log variance equal to 1. 8 
φi, firms with low mi and φi are the ones that will exit when trade is opened; but since these tend to be 
high-wage jobs because of the low mi's, what this means is that free trade tends to eliminate the good jobs 
along with the high-marginal-cost firms. As a result, trade actually reduces wage inequality. Note that 
unless mi and φi are strongly negatively correlated, the firms with the high wages tend to be those with 
high marginal costs, which are therefore the smaller ones, and the ones that do not export - the exact 
opposite of what is predicted in Egger and Kreickemeier, and a prediction at odds with the data. However, 
allowing for a sufficiently strong negative correlation reverses these correlations, as the authors show in 
simulations. In that case, trade once again increases wage inequality, disproportionately killing off the 
'bad' jobs. 
A third heterogenous-firms approach to trade and wage inequality is found in Helpman, Istkhoki 
and Redding (2010). They add a number of additional elements: Search frictions, bargaining between 
workers and employers, idiosyncratic match quality, and employer testing to identify which workers will 
be the most productive. Workers search for employers, and find an employer with a probability that 
depends on the ratio of vacancies to workers searching (this is a one-period model, so a worker who does 
not find a job on the first try simply has a zero income). Any worker has an idiosyncratic match quality 
with any given employer; higher-quality matches result in more productivity on the job, and a low-quality 
match can actually reduce the firm's overall output, so each firm has an interest in hiring only workers 
who will be good matches. Consequently, when a worker finds an employer who is hiring, the employer 
subjects the worker to a test that reveals whether the match quality is above or below a given threshold 
chosen by the firm. Workers who are revealed to be above the threshold are hired, and then bargain with 
the employer for the wage. Workers below the threshold remain unemployed, and receive zero income. In 
equilibrium, more productive firms screen more assiduously than less productive firms, in the sense that 
they set their threshold for match quality higher. This is because it is costly to set a higher threshold (this 
is assumed; the technology of test-taking that would lead to this property is not modelled); and it is 
worthwhile only for the highest-productivity firm, with its high anticipated volume of sales, to incur the 
high cost of a very stringent test. Consequently, a worker who passes the test at a high-productivity firm 
is revealed to be highly productive at that firm, and the combination of the firm's productivity with the 
worker's high revealed match quality imply that the bargaining surplus between worker and firm is large - 
and so the worker and firm will agree to a high wage. The result is that workers at large, high-productivity 
firms receive higher wages than workers at small, low-productivity firms. (However, workers are 
indifferent between applying for work at high- and low-productivity firms. A high productivity firm pays 
high wages to the workers it hires, but it does not hire many of the workers who apply. These effects 
cancel each other out.) 
In addition, trade intensifies these effects. It increases the incentive to screen assiduously at high-
productivity firms due to the extra volume of sales that will come from exports. It decreases the incentive 
to screen at marginal surviving firms, which reduce their output and do not export. As a result, trade 
unambiguously increases wage inequality (and in a much stronger sense than in the Egger and 
Kreickemeir model, since it actually produces a new wage distribution that dominates the autarky one by 
second-order stochastic dominance). In addition, trade increases unemployment by increasing the market 
share of large firms, and then making those large firms more picky about hiring. Thus (as in Egger and 
Kreiemeier) trade further increases income inequality by increasing the fraction of workers receiving zero 
income. 
2.3. New Approaches to Comparative Advantage and Inequality 
The heterogenous-firms literature has provided a number of channels in which trade can affect income 
inequality even between identical countries. Beyond that, a number of recent papers have re-examined 
and extended the comparative-advantage approach in ways that allow for a more nuanced view of trade 
and income inequality than was available before. 9 
2.3.1 Trade in Tasks, Revisited 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) explore the implications of trade in tasks, earlier examined by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996). Their emphasis is the possibility of productivity benefits from offshoring, 
which can in principle make offshoring a Pareto-improving phenomenon. In the simplest version of the 
model, there are two goods, X and Y, both of which can be produced in Home by completing a given set 
of tasks. Some of the tasks need to be performed by high-skilled labor but others can be performed by 
unskilled labor. Consider first the production technology if only domestic labor is used. For good j there 
is a continuum of measure 1 of tasks of each type that must be completed to produce 1 unit of output, and 
for each high-skill task aHj units of high-skill labor are required, while for each low-skill task aLj units of 
low-skill labor are required. Thus, a unit of good j requires aHj units of high-skill labor and aLj units of 
low-skill labor total to produce. Assume that aHX/aLX > aHY/aLY, so that good X is skill-intensive. If we let 
Home be a small economy so that the prices of the two goods are set on world markets, and let X be the 
numeraire, then this determines income to both kinds of worker as the solution to the two zero-profit 
conditions: 
aHX WH + aLX WL = 1  (3) 
aHY WH + aLY WL = P, 
where wH is the wage paid to high-skilled labor, wL is the wage paid to low-skilled labor, and P is the 
price of good Y. Since X is high-skilled-labor intensive, this pair of linear equations has a unique solution 
for the wages wH and wL. Now, allow for producers in Home to import some low-skill tasks from workers 
in Foreign. Suppose that to perform task i in Foreign for good j requires aLj𝗽t(i) units of labor, where 
βt(i) > 1 to reflect the logistical and monitoring problems of performing a task abroad. These problems 
can be weighed against the cost benefit of employing lower-cost labor, due to the fact that the low-skill 
wage in Foreign, w*, is lower than the low-skill wage in Home, wL. A home firm will offshore a task i to 
Foreign if w*βt(i)<wL, and will source the task domestically otherwise. Without loss of generality, the 
function t(∙) is increasing, so that tasks with a higher index are harder to offshore. In that case, there will 
be a cutoff task, say, I, such that all producers of either good in Home will offshore low-skill tasks i ∈ 
[0,..., I] and source all tasks i ∈ (I,... 1] in Home. As a result, for given factor prices, the low-skill labor 
costs for a producer in either industry are reduced by a common proportion, say to a fraction Ω(I) of their 
original value (it is mechanical to compute Ω (I) by integrating the cost savings over i, but the details do 
not concern us here). This changes equations (3) to: 
aHXwH + aLX Ω(I)wL = 1    (4) 
aHYwH + aLY Ω(I)wL = P, 
It is immediate that setting wH and Ω(I)wL to the values held by the values wH and wL in the 
solution to (3) will now solve (4). As a result, offshoring has now increased the wages of low-skilled 
workers in Home, by a factor of 1/ Ω(I), without changing wages for high-skilled workers in Home - a 
Pareto improvement. This is, of course, the opposite of what many commentators on globalization would 
expect, particularly since it is only low-skilled workers whose jobs are being shipped overseas. The point 
is that low-skilled workers in Home are benefitting from what is in effect an improvement in their 
productivity. It is as if each blue- collar worker in Home previously had to construct her own chair to sit 
on to work, but now globalization allows her to hire a low-wage worker overseas to build the chair, 
allowing the Home blue-collar worker to concentrate on other tasks, get more work done, and earn a 
higher income as a result. 
A few qualifications to this result are in order. First, the finding that offshoring can be Pareto 
improving through productivity effects is not, strictly speaking, new. It shows up as a special case of the 
Feenstra and Hanson model (1996, p.101), for example, but the mechanism in the Grossman-Rossi-
Hansberg model brings it into exceptionally sharp focus. Second, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg point 
out that it is mitigated and can be overturned by terms- of-trade effects, if the small-country assumption is 10 
relaxed. In particular, when offshoring becomes possible (or when it becomes more cost effective due to a 
drop in the parameter β), the equilibrium is changed in a way that is very similar to the effect of 
increasing the supply of low-skill labor in Home. This increases Home output of the low-skill-intensive 
good Y relative to the high-skill-intensive good X, which in the event that Home is a large country will 
tend to push the relative price of Y, namely, P, down. This shifts the zero-profit conditions (4) in a way 
that pushes wH up and wL down, following conventional Stolper-Samuelson logic. If this effect is strong 
enough, low-skill workers in Home are hurt by offshoring. Finally, if the model is modified to allow for 
the possibility of more factors than goods - if, for example, in equilibrium Home produces only good X, 
then this same feature of offshoring, that it acts like an increase in the supply of unskilled labor, will push 
wL down even if Home is a small open economy so that there is no terms-of-trade effect. Whether the 
productivity effect or these labor supply effects dominates is an empirical question. 
2.3.2 Continuum of Skills 
Some recent work has aimed at a richer and more realistic account of income inequality by looking at 
trade models with a continuum of skill levels and hence a continuum of income levels. Blanchard and 
Willman (2008) formulate a model with a continuum of goods indexed by j ∈  [0,1] and a labor force with 
a continuum of ability levels, a ∈ [0,1], exogenously given as realizations of a random variable. In order 
to produce product j, a worker needs to complete the appropriate education, which costs the worker 
c(j,a). This is increasing in j, so that industries are ordered in increasing order of skill requirement; and 
decreasing in a, so that the cost of acquiring any sort of education is smaller for a person endowed with 
high ability. Further, 
𝜕2𝑐 (𝑗,𝑎)
𝜕𝑗𝜕𝑎 < 0, so that the marginal cost of choosing a more difficult industry is lower 
for a person of higher ability. Once a worker has acquired the skill required to produce j, she can produce 
1 unit of it. Equilibrium is a function giving the price of each good j ∈[0,1] that induces each worker of 
ability a to choose an industry j such that the quantity of each good produced is equal to the quantity 
demanded. The price function must be increasing in j, to provide an incentive for workers to acquire the 
skills required to produce some of each good. The exact shape of the price function is determined as the 
solution to a differential equation. 
This structure allows the authors to look at questions of income distribution that would be 
unthinkable in a model limited to high-skill and low-skill workers only. For example, the authors are 
interested in the effects of trade on the middle class. They examine one numerical example in which 
Home has an educational cost function given by 
  𝑐(𝑗,𝑎) =
(1−𝑎)
𝑎  
𝑗2
2,    (5) 
and Foreign has an educational cost function given by: 
  𝑐(𝑗,𝑎) =
(1−𝑎)
𝑎  
2𝑗3
3  .   (6) 
The consequence is that the cost functions are quite similar except as j gets close to 1, in which 
region Foreign's cost function becomes sharply higher than Home's. Thus, Foreign's educational system 
has trouble generating the skills required for the most advanced industries. Other than that, the two 
countries are identical, with a uniform distribution of a's and Leontieff preferences. Solving the 
equilibrium, we observe 'sorting down' in Home for low-skill workers, meaning that a worker of a given 
ability chooses a lower-skill industry than the worker would have chosen under autarky. At the same time, 
we observe 'sorting up' for Home's high-skill workers. Put differently, under trade, Home workers flee the 
middle- range industries. An interpretation is that Foreign's educational costs discourage Foreign's high-
ability workers from pursuing the high-skill industries, so a disproportionate number of Foreign's high-
ability workers wind up in middle-range industries (a pattern exacerbated by trade with Home, which will 
lower the price of high-skill products). This pushes down the prices of middle-range goods compared to 11 
what would have been observed in Home under autarky, causing Home middle-ability workers to flee the 
middle, with upper-middle-ability workers fleeing upward and lower-middle-ability workers downward. 
Thus, in Home, trade 'hollows out the middle class.' In addition, the effect of trade on welfare is non-
monotonic: Low-ability and high-ability Home workers benefit from trade, but due to the crash in the 
prices of medium-level goods, a range of middle-ability Home workers is hurt. Obviously, none of this 
discussion would have been possible in a model limited to 'high-skill' and 'low-skill' workers. 
A closely related paper is Costinot and Vogel (2010), who also look at a model with a continuum 
of goods, each of which is produced with labor alone and which differ in their skill intensities. Precisely, 
the output of an industry with skill-intensivity index 𝜎 is equal to A(s, 𝜎) per worker, for a worker of skill 
level s, where A(s,a) is increasing in s and satisfies: 
 
𝐴(𝑠′,𝜎′)
𝐴(𝑠,𝜎′) > 
𝐴(𝑠′,𝜎)
𝐴(𝑠,𝜎)  (7) 
for any s,s', 𝜎, 𝜎' such that s' > s and 𝜎' > 𝜎, so that skill is disproportionally valuable in high-skill-
intensive industries. This assumption is called 'complementarities in production.' There is an exogenous 
supply of each of a continuum of different skill levels in each country, represented by the function V(s) 
for Home and V*(s) for Foreign. Equilibrium is again a schedule of prices such that the way workers 
choose to sort themselves across industries given that price schedule creates supply that matches with 
consumer demand for each good. Condition (7) ensures that each skill level chooses one and only one 
industry, and that higher- skill workers match themselves in equilibrium to higher-skill-intensive 
industries. 
With this framework, the authors are able to look at a number of interesting possible effects of 
trade on income distribution. First, they have a simple and elegant generalization of Stolper- Samuelson. 
If Home is skill-abundant relative to Foreign, which means that V(s')/V(s) > V*(s')/V*(s) whenever s' > s, 
then trade increases income inequality in Home, meaning that  
 
𝑤′(𝑠′)
𝑤′(𝑠) > 
𝑤(𝑠′)
𝑤(𝑠)  (8) 
whenever s
' > s, where w(s) denotes the wage paid to a Home worker of skill level s under autarky and 
w
'(s) is the corresponding wage under free trade. The opposite effect is found in Foreign. In addition, 
they analyze a simple concept of offshoring: Suppose that technology in Home is superior to the 
technology in Foreign, in that the A(s, 𝜎) function in Home is a scalar multiple of the function in Foreign. 
Suppose that under free trade, workers produce in Home with Home's technology and workers in Foreign 
produce with Foreign's technology. However, when offshoring is allowed, a producer in Home can hire 
workers in Foreign to produce output using Home's superior technology. Costinot and Vogel show that 
this is equivalent to increasing the labor supply of Foreign across the board, and as a result it pushes down 
the wages of low- skill workers in both countries, pushing up the wages of high-skill workers in both 
countries, and raising income inequality in both countries in the sense of inequality (8). This is, of course, 
an interpretation of offshoring that is very close to the Feenstra-Hanson view. 
These are both generalizations of earlier results on North-South trade. Perhaps the most 
interesting point, however, involves findings on North-North trade. Suppose that the Home economy is 
more diverse than Foreign, in the sense that there is a cutoff skill level s' such that among skill levels less 
than s' Home is low-skill abundant relative to Foreign but among skill levels above s' Home is high-skill 
abundant relative to Foreign. In other words, compared to Foreign, Home has fatter tails in its skill 
distribution, rather than a difference in average skill abundance. Then when we let the two countries 
trade, low-skill Home workers sort down; high-skill workers sort up; and wages of middle-income Home 
workers fall relative to workers at both ends of the spectrum. In other words, this is the 'hollowing out of 
the middle class' studied by Blanchard and Willmann, arrived at by a somewhat different mechanism. 12 
2.4. Labor Market Frictions 
A number of recent papers explore trades' impact on income distribution in the presence of labor market 
frictions. Mitra and Ranjan (2007), for example, apply models of search unemployment to examine the 
impact of offshoring. For reasons similar to the mechanism in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), they 
find that offshoring in a given industry can lower domestic unemployment in that industry. The point is, 
once again, that offshoring can create a productivity benefit for domestic labor, and that induces domestic 
firms to increase the rate at which they create vacancies for domestic employment. In the long run, this 
reduces unemployment. Anderson (2009) studies a model in which workers must choose in which sector 
to acquire skills, becoming a specific factor after that choice is made; opening up trade increases income 
inequality by increasing income differentials across industries. 
A different approach to labor market frictions is pursued in Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren 
(2008, 2010). In those papers, a worker is assumed to be able to switch industries at any time, but must 
incur two costs. The first is a common cost, a parameter constant across time and the same for all 
workers. The second is idiosyncratic and time-varying, and can be negative. For example, a worker may 
become bored of her work, or have an altercation with a supervisor, or need to move geographically for 
personal reasons to a part of the country where the industry she was in does not exist. On the other hand, 
the worker may be at the moment really enjoying her work, or have children who are attached to their 
school friends, making a move costly. These idiosyncratic, time-varying costs are important because they 
allow for a model that generates a very important fact in the data: Gross flows of workers across indus-
tries are an order of magnitude greater than net flows. At any given moment, between any two industries, 
one tends to see large numbers of workers moving in opposite directions at the same time. 
Building these features into a rational-expectations model, one finds a number of implications for 
trade and income inequality. (i) The effect of trade on the distribution of wages can be very different from 
the effect of trade on the distribution of lifetime incomes. It is easy to construct an example, and with 
realistic parameter values, of a trade liberalization that lowers real wages for the import competing 
industry in the short run and the long run, but that increases the expected lifetime utility of all workers in 
the import-competing sector. This is because of option value: Each worker in the import-competing sector 
knows that there is a positive probability that in a given number of years she will choose to move to one 
of the other sectors. Since trade liberalization raises the real wage in those industries, the value of that 
option has now gone up. (Similar issues arise in the search literature, as discussed at length in Davidson, 
Martin and Matusz (1999); see Davidson and Matusz (2009, Ch. 8) for an applied example.) 
(ii) Announcing trade liberalization in advance tends to soften the blow for workers in the import-
competing industry and also reduce the benefit to workers in the export industry. This is because of 
anticipatory movement of workers out of the import-competing industry, pulling up wages there before 
the liberalization occurs, and pulling wages down in the export sector. In the limit, with enough advance 
warning, all workers are guaranteed to have the same sign of net benefit from the liberalization, but this 
could be positive or negative. 
2.5. Consumer Effects and Incomplete Contracts 
We now look at two strands that have not been explored much but could capture important pieces of the 
relationship between trade and inequality. 
2.5.1 A Consumer-Side Approach 
A very different and potentially very promising approach is taken by Fajgelbaum, Grossman and 
Helpman (2009). They focus on consumer-side effects of trade on income inequality. The model is built 
on two sectors, a competitive numeraire sector producing a homogeneous good and a monopolistically-
competitive sector in which products are differentiated horizontally (as in standard monopolistic 
competition models) but also vertically, so that consumers can choose different varieties and also 
different qualities of differentiated product. Both sectors use only labor to produce output. Workers differ 13 
in their productivity according to an exogenous distribution. They all have the same utility function, 
which is non-homothetic: consumers with higher income demand higher-quality goods. If two economies 
open to trade, not only will the number of firms in each country and the product diversity available to 
each consumer be affected as in standard monopolistic competition models, but the quality composition 
of goods will also be affected in complicated ways that depend on income inequality. The authors study 
an example with two countries that are identical except that one of them has more productive workers on 
average. When the cost of transporting high-quality goods falls, the number of high-quality firms rises, 
benefitting affluent consumers in both countries. This draws resources away from low-quality goods, 
reducing the product diversity available to low-income consumers and, for some parameter values, 
lowering their welfare. 
The novelty in this model is that trade does not affect the distribution of income at all, in terms 
of the numeraire. That is fixed in each country by the exogenous distribution of worker productivities. It 
does, however, affect the distribution of real incomes, because consumers at different income levels 
consume different goods. In this sense, it is a consumer-side account of trade and income distribution, 
while previous approaches work through the factor markets. Since in truth the rich and the poor certainly 
do consume different bundles of commodities and different qualities of goods, this channel may be a very 
important one to explore in the future. 
2.5.2 Implicit Contracts 
For people who do not live in an Arrow-Debreu economy, good luck can translate into high income and 
bad luck can lead to poverty. For this reason, risk-sharing institutions can have an enormous effect on 
income inequality, and to the extent that trade affects those institutions they can be an additional channel 
through which trade affects inequality. An early exploration of this idea is found in Matusz (1985), who 
incorporates a simple form of incomplete contract from the macroeconomics literature into a Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In that model, firms in one industry suffer random, idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 
Employers are risk neutral and workers are risk averse. Employers would like to be able to offer 
employment contracts to workers that put the workers to work in a high-productivity state and lay them 
off in a low-productivity state, with a payment to the worker that does not depend on the state, but they 
are prevented from doing so because employers cannot credibly commit to paying the worker anything in 
a state in which the worker is not producing output. As a result, the low-productivity state has (inefficient) 
positive employment with a positive probability, with a positive wage paid only when the worker is 
employed. The fact that the wage will be zero in the event of a layoff implies that firms must pay a risk 
premium to workers, which lowers expected profits. Matusz shows that in this sort of model a weakened 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds - over a significant portion of the parameter space, trade raises the 
welfare of workers and lowers the returns to capital if the economy is labor-abundant (and vice-versa if it 
is labor scarce). However, even when that familiar relationship holds, it is possible that trade increases the 
unemployment rate in the implicit contracts sector, with the wage for employed workers rising enough to 
give an increase in expected utility to workers. It is further possible that the aggregate unemployment rate 
rises even when the industry's unemployment rate does not, because a larger fraction of workers is drawn 
out of the full-employment sector and into the sector with implicit contracts and positive unemployment. 
In both cases, the point is that although the average worker's welfare is increased by trade, because of 
implicit contracts, both unemployment and wage inequality can rise. 
The idea has been extended to the 'invisible handshake' studied by labor economists, the idea that 
a risk-neutral employer may offer wages smoothed over states of nature to a risk-averse worker, in effect 
selling insurance at the same time as it buys labor. However, since these arrangements are implicit 
contracts and based on shocks that are not observable to third parties, they depend upon reputation built 
out of repeated interactions. The only punishment available to deter an employer from reneging on its 
wage commitment today is the loss of the worker tomorrow. Consequently, if employers are not 
sufficiently patient, only imperfect insurance can credibly be offered, and in that case an employer will 
cut wages in lean times. The upshot is that the more impatient an employer is, the more volatile individual 14 
workers' wages will be, and the more variance will be observed in the cross section among 
observationally identical workers. 
Bertrand (2004) follows the implications of this thinking in the context of international trade, 
showing that where firms face liquidity constraints and can exit due to bankruptcy, an import shock can 
make employers effectively less patient by raising the probability of bankruptcy and raising their effective 
discount rates. Thus, a rise in imports in a given industry can increase wage inequality within that 
industry (and by the same token opening up an export opportunity can reduce it). Karabay and McLaren 
(2010) examine invisible handshakes in a two-country general-equilibrium model with both goods trade 
and offshoring of tasks (in the primitive sense that they look at autarky versus free goods trade, and free 
goods trade versus complete integration of world goods and factor markets). Even though there is no 
bankruptcy in the model, trade has large effects on wage volatility through implicit contracts. An 
exporting sector sees a rise in its output price due to trade, which raises the amount it loses if the worker 
walks away due to a wage dispute. Therefore, the penalty to reneging on a wage promise is steeper, 
allowing the employer to make promises of stable wages with more credibility. Consequently, wage 
inequality falls within an export sector, with the opposite effect in an import-competing sector. On the 
other hand, offshoring from a labor- scarce economy to a labor-abundant one makes it easy for an 
employer to find a new worker to replace one it has lost, thus reducing the punishment to reneging and 
making it harder for employers to promise stable wages credibly. As a result, an offshoring industry sees 
an increase in wage inequality, ceteris paribus. Putting these together, the model predicts that implicit 
contract effects produce a net increase in wage inequality in a labor-scarce economy due to both forms of 
globalization together, and the opposite effect in a labor-abundant economy. (Of course, in practice these 
effects are combined with all of the other effects on wage inequality highlighted above, so it could be 
difficult to disentangle the effect empirically.) 
2.6. Summary of Theory Developments 
A summary of the main thrusts of the theory can be put as follows. The older theory offered two stories: 
Trade affects inequality either by affecting the skill premium (in the Stolper- Samuelson theorem), or by 
affecting industry premia (in the specific-factors model). It was hard to rationalize how trade could raise 
inequality everywhere in the world at the same time, or inequality within any group of similarly-skilled 
workers all doing the same job. It was also hard to see how North-North trade could affect inequality at 
all. But now, we have stories that predict rising skill premia across countries as a result of North-South 
trade in tasks, and even as a result of North-North trade in goods due to R&D effects or the skill bias of 
the transport sector. We have high-dimensional models that go beyond the skill premium to analyze the 
effect of trade on the 'middle class,' and distinguish between wage inequality and inequality in lifetime 
consumption through explicitly dynamic models of labor adjustment. We are also able to analyze the 
effects of trade on inequality among observationally identical workers doing the same job in the same 
industry, through heterogeneous-firms models or implicit contracts models. This rich set of stories helps 
in describing the effects of trade on income distribution in the real world.
 15 
3.  EMPIRICAL WORK 
An immense empirical literature exists on the possible linkages between trade and inequality. Most of this 
literature predates the 'new' trade models and focuses on testing the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework for trade-inequality linkages. A number of literature surveys also review this work. See for 
example, Feenstra and Hanson (2001), and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2007). As in Section 2, we begin 
in Section 3 with only a brief review of the empirical literature associated with the 'older' trade models, 
and then move on to review empirical papers that test the newer theories linking trade to inequality 
described in Section 2. 
3.1. Earlier Work: Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factor Models 
An excellent summary of the literature on trade and wages is provided by Robert Feenstra in the 
introduction to his 2000 volume, The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Feenstra begins by 
documenting a sharp increase in the ratio of the wages of non-production workers to production workers 
between 1982 and 1994. Summarizing the papers in the volume, Feenstra concludes that there is some 
role for international trade in affecting the wages earned by American workers. Goldberg and Pacvnik 
(2007), Feenstra (2008), and others conclude that stylized facts on the evolution of inequality within 
developing countries as they open up to trade are not consistent with a naive view of the HO model. 
Donald R. Davis and Prachi Mishra (2007) go further and argue that "Stolper-Samuelson is dead." They 
write that use of trade theory to suggest that liberalization will raise the wages of the unskilled in 
unskilled labor abundant countries is "worse than wrong—it is dangerous." Davis and Mishra show that 
such arguments are based on a very narrow interpretation of the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem. In 
particular, SS holds only if all countries produce all goods, if the goods imported from abroad and 
produced domestically are close substitutes, or if comparative advantage can be fixed vis-a-vis all trading 
partners. As an illustration, a poor country in a world with many factors and many goods may no longer 
have a comparative advantage in producing low-skill goods. This is easy to understand in the context of 
three countries; consider, for example, the United States, Mexico, and China. Although Mexico might 
have a comparative advantage in producing low-skill goods in trade with the United States, its 
comparative advantage switches vis-a-vis trade with China. 
In part to address these and other shortcomings of the HO framework for explaining the rise in 
inequality within both developing and developed countries, as well as within industries, empirical 
investigations have branched out into a number of directions, including firm-level analysis, new 
approaches to trade in tasks and offshoring, and, to a limited degree, implicit contracts. 
3.2. Empirical Work on Heterogeneous Firms and Bargaining 
In part because the literature on firm heterogeneity is so new, and in part because the data demands for 
testing these theories are quite high, not many studies are available in this area. To take firm or worker 
heterogeneity, or both, into account properly information at both the firm and individual employee level is 
typically required, suggesting the need for matched employee-employer datasets. In this section, we 
review several recent papers that have succeeded in contributing to this literature. 
The pioneering work on trade and income inequality with heterogeneous firms actually predates 
the theory. Bernard and Jensen (1997) study the Annual Survey of Manufactures from the US Census 
Bureau to decompose the large rise in average skilled wage premia that occurred over the 1980's. They 
show that a substantial fraction of the increase occurred between plants, in other words, by intra-
industry shifts in the allocation of workers from plants with lower skill premia to firms with higher 
premia. This between-plant effect is larger than the within-plant effect (which is merely a rise in the skill 
premium for any one firm over time). Indeed, by some measures, the between-plant effect is completely 
dominant (Table 5). Further, it occurs entirely among firms that export, and vanishes when the sample is 
restricted to firms with only domestic sales. This was an early indicator that trade might cause an increase 
in wage inequality through within-industry effects, a mechanism very different from Heckscher- Ohlin, 16 
and alerted the field that firm heterogeneity may have something important to do with the effect of trade 
on inequality. 
More recently, Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) combine insights from the Melitz (2003) 
model with worker heterogeneity to provide a compelling empirical example of the importance of some 
of the more recent theoretical breakthroughs. These authors link worker-level panel data with firm-level 
and industry-level data to obtain a rich dataset that allows them to test many implications of the most 
advanced trade models (e.g. heterogeneous-firm models that incorporate heterogeneous labor) for Brazil. 
In so doing, the authors are able to assess the impact on jobs of Brazil's trade liberalization during the 
1990s while controlling for a number of worker-specific, firm-specific, industry-specific, and economy-
wide structural reforms. Menezes-Filho and Muendler's dataset allows them to follow workers throughout 
the liberalization period and observe the path of their employment histories in greater detail than previous 
studies. They are particularly interested in the effects of trade liberalization on employment status, type of 
employment (formal or informal), and job reallocations. 
Menezes-Filho and Muendler's results show that exporting firms and firms in industries with a 
"comparative advantage" shed workers more frequently. Moreover, these same firms also hire workers 
less frequently than the average firm. Thus, on net, trade liberalization leads to net employment losses in 
these firms. This is surprising given the standard predictions of international trade models that would 
indicate that these sectors and firms would potentially hire more workers when liberalization occurs. 
Menezes-Filho and Muendler also show that tariff reductions and increased import penetration are 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of a worker transitioning into informality and 
unemployment, as well as with a lower probability of a transition from informality back to formal 
employment. Furthermore, they find that trade liberalization in Brazil has been associated with longer 
reallocation times for workers moving from one formal-sector job to another formal-sector job. Their 
results are robust to different levels of exposure to trade, firm-level productivity, worker heterogeneity, as 
well as other general trends that occurred in the country during the period studied-such as skill-biased 
technological change and labor market reforms. 
Kaplan and Verhoogen (2009) use matched employer-employee data from Mexico to examine the 
wage premia paid by exporters in the Mexican manufacturing sector. Wage premia are defined as wages 
above what workers would earn elsewhere in the labor market. Because of the nature of their data, Kaplan 
and Verhoogen are able to decompose plant level wages into a component that reflects skill composition 
and a component that reflects wage premia. Their identification strategy is based on the peso devaluation 
of 1994 that they argue differentially affected incentives to export within industries. Comparing across 
plants within industries, they find that roughly two thirds of the higher level of wages in larger, more 
productive plants are explained by wage premia and that nearly the entire differential within industry 
wage changes induced by the shock to exports is explained by wage premia and not by skills. The authors 
conclude that sorting on individual ability is not responsible for the well-documented correlation between 
exporting and wages. 
As the first contribution in the literature to account for both firm heterogeneity and intermediate 
trade in their analyses, Amiti and Davis (2008) offer a theoretical and empirical examination of the 
impact of tariff cuts on workers' wages that accounts for the extent of a firm's engagement in international 
trade. Using Indoneisan manufacturing census data for 1991-2000, a period that encompasses Indonesian 
trade liberalization, the authors develop a general equilibrium model to estimate this relationship. They 
find that the impact of a given tariff change on a firm's workers' wages is dependent upon that firm's role 
in the global economy. That is, a 10 percentage point decrease in output tariffs will lower wages of 
import- competing firms by 3 percent but will raise wages at exporting firms by 3 percent. Likewise, a 
decrease in input tariffs by 10 percentage points will increase wages by 12 percent at firms that rely on 
imports but will have an insignificant impact on the wages of firms that rely on a domestic supply. 
As Amiti and Davis (2008) summarize, their findings show that trade liberalization raises wages 
for workers at firms that are most globalized and lowers wages at those firms that are either marginalized 
in the global economy and/or oriented toward the domestic market. This provides some confirmation for 
the ideas in theoretical work such as Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Helpman, Istkhoki and Redding 17 
(2010) that hypothesizes a relationship between firm-specific wages and how the firm responds to 
globalization. 
Bustos (2007) posits that an examination of wage inequality that examines the interaction 
between trade and technology—as opposed to selecting one explanation in preference over the other—
will offer a better explanation of the relationship between global trade and inequality. Bustos therefore 
presents a model of the relationship between trade liberalization and demand for technology and skill 
among firms in developing countries that accounts for firm heterogeneity. She tests this model using 
panel data from Argentine manufacturing firms. The dataset spans 1992-1996 and therefore captures a 
period of trade and capital account liberalization in Argentina. 
Bustos finds a strong relationship between exporting and increases in technology investment and 
skill upgrading. Specifically she finds that, prior to trade liberalization, continuing exporters and foreign 
owned firms employed higher skilled labor than those firms that were domestically owned and that had 
never exported. Those firms that began exporting after liberalization upgraded worker skill more quickly 
than those firms that remained exclusively in the domestic market; they also upgraded technology more 
quickly than all other firms. Further, after trade liberalization, new and continuing exporters as well as 
foreign owned firms spent 53-69 percent more in technology than their domestic non-exporting 
counterparts. Those firms that invested more in technology upgrading also realized a faster increase in 
skilled labor. Bustos concludes that, due to the consequences of rising demand for technological in-
vestment, trade liberalization can have a strong impact on worker skill upgrading. 
While much of the literature (for example, Verhoogen (2008) and Bustos (2007)) looks at the 
impact of the act of exporting on firm behavior, Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010) focus on how the 
destination of those exports explains firm behavior. Brambilla et al develop and then test an integrated 
theory of export destinations and skills. Exploring the linkages among exports, export destinations, and 
the use of skilled labor by firms, Brambilla et al theorize that firms exporting to high income destinations 
will hire a higher proportion of high skilled workers and will pay them higher wages than firms that either 
export to low or middle income countries or sell their products domestically. They test their theory with 
19982000 panel data from Argentine manufacturing firms. Their findings show that Argentine firms 
exporting to high-income countries are associated with higher skilled workers and higher average wages 
than firms that either do not export or export to middle income countries. However, they find no 
significant difference in firms' used of skilled labor between those firms selling their product domestically 
and those exporting to low and middle income countries. The authors reason that these results are due to 
the similarities in the domestic and export markets among low and middle income countries. Their theory 
and results are in line with Verhoogen's (2008) findings on the quality upgrades of exporting firms and 
Bustos' (2007, 2009) work on technology and skill upgrading behavior of exporting firms. The results 
further suggest that non-homotheticities in demand of the sort explored by Fajgelbaum, Grossman and 
Helpman (2009) are very important in practice and deserve much more attention. 
To sum up, the emerging work on trade and inequality with firm-level data appears to be 
confirming a central role for between-firm effects in governing the relationship between trade and 
inequality, and the available results seem to support the thrust of theoretical models in Section 2.2 that 
predict a rise in inequality with more openness. 
3.3. New Empirical Work on Trade in Tasks 
Much new empirical work focuses on the fragmentation of the production process, or off- shoring. Recall 
from Section 2.3.1 that one of the pioneering theory models in this area was provided by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996); not surprisingly, they also pioneered the empirical work (Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 
1997, and 1999)). Recall that in that model, offshoring increases the relative demand for skilled labor in 
both countries involved because the offshored tasks are more skill-intensive than those previously 
performed in the country to which they were offshored, but they are less skill-intensive than those in the 
country that is doing the offshoring. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) test whether their explanation for the increase in the demand for 
skill, based on more offshoring, is consistent with the pattern of increasing wage inequality in the United 18 
States. They consider the alternative hypothesis that skill-biased technological change accounted for the 
observed increase in wage inequality. They proxy for technical change with the fraction of high-
technology equipment in each industry's capital stock and they measure offshoring with the intermediate 
inputs imported by each industry. They use a two-step procedure, first to identify the impact of offshoring 
and high technology investments on productivity and prices, and then to trace through the induced 
productivity and price changes to calculate production and non-production wages. 
Using data for the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1979 and 1990, Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) find that 25 percent of the increase in the relative wage of nonproduction workers was explained 
by offshoring and about 30 percent by technological change. They conclude that both offshoring and the 
increased use of high-tech capital are important in explaining the increase in the relative wage of skilled 
workers. They also examine the impact on real wages as distinct from relative wages, which are the focus 
of measures of inequality. They find that the real wages of production workers were probably unaffected 
by offshoring activities while the real wages of non-production workers increased by 1 to 2 percentage 
points. Sitchinava (2008) updates the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) paper to 1996 and also takes into 
account the possibility of services offshoring. Sitchinava finds that most of the increase in the relative 
wages of nonproduction relative to production workers can be explained by technical change, which is 
proxied with the share of high-technology equipment in the capital stock. 
Adapting Feenstra and Hanson (1999) to measure service offshoring, Amiti and Wei (2009) 
provide evidence for the effects of both service and material offshoring on domestic productivity growth. 
Using US Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 1992-2000, they find that service offshoring has a 
significant positive effect on labor productivity growth, accounting for approximately 10 percent of 
average growth in this factor. While material offshoring also has a positive effect, it is smaller in 
magnitude—accounting for 5 percent of average growth in labor productivity—and not significant across 
all specifications. They conclude that service offshoring does have a positive impact on labor productivity 
growth in the US and speculate that the smaller and less significant values for material offshoring may be 
due to possible decreasing returns from scale and over time from this sector. 
Liu and Trefler (2008) analyze the impact of not only offshoring but also inshoring—the sale of 
service produced in the US to unaffiliated buyers in China and India—across several indicators: workers' 
change of occupation and industry; weeks spent unemployed as a share of total weeks in the labor force; 
and earnings. They find that the total net effect of inshoring and offshoring is positive. However, for those 
workers in industries exposed to offshoring and those workers who are less educated the effect is either 
less positive or negative. 
A different approach is explored by Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2009), who 
focus on the effects of trade across different types of task, as measured by the routineness of different 
occupations. Typically, highly routine occupations are associated with workers who have lower 
educational attainment, while less routine occupations are associated with higher skills and educational 
attainment. 
Why should routineness matter? Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) posit that improvements 
in technology make offshoring less costly. Cost reductions are much more likely for routine tasks, which 
are more easily codified and can be communicated and consequently transferred to overseas affiliates. 
Ebenstein et al test this hypothesis by assessing the empirical relationship between the routine nature of a 
task and offshoring. Their measure of routine is based on Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) who describe 
routine jobs as "tasks that can be expressed using procedural or 'rules-based' logic, that is codified in a 
fully specified sequence of logical programming commands ("If-Then-Do" statements) that designate 
unambiguously what actions the machine will perform and in what sequence at each contingency to 
achieve the desired result." While Autor et al (2003) use routineness to designate which jobs can be easily 
performed by computers, the jobs that are classified as routine also include the jobs in manufacturing that 
we typically think of as being offshorable. These jobs include: attaching hands to faces of watches, 
sewing fasteners and decorative trimming to articles and, though not mentioned explicitly in their paper, 
include services tasks that we think of as offshorable such as answering telephones. 19 
We can contrast this occupation-based approach to a well-known alternative, which is to examine 
the changes in import penetration across industries (what Goldberg and Pacvnik refer to as the 
"differential exposure approach"). A difficulty with that approach is that, in the event that workers can 
change industries more easily than occupations, such an approach will miss the main effect; industry 
premia will be largely arbitraged away, but premia to each occupation can be large and very much 
affected by trade. Ebenstein et al address this problem by calculating an occupation-specific measure of 
offshoring, import competition, and export activity, and show that although international trade has not had 
large effects on industry premia, it has had large, significant effects on occupation-specific wages for 
routine workers. 
Ebenstein et al merge Current Population Survey (CPS) data on US wage earners from 1983 
through 2002 with data on import competition, export activity, and offshoring employment of U.S. 
multinational firms to show that the impact of offshoring on labor-market outcomes depends both on the 
location of offshore activity and on the routineness of the task performed by the worker. Expansion in 
offshore employment in low-income locations is associated with wage reductions for routine workers. 
However, offshore activity in high- income locations is positively correlated with routine wages. These 
associations, which are significantly stronger in the 1990s relative to the previous decade, parallel earlier 
findings by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), who show that US manufacturing plants whose dominant 
industry is one in which low-wage-country imports are large are more likely to exit and less likely to 
expand, and these differences are more pronounced for more labor-intensive plants; imports from other 
countries have a much smaller effect, and sometimes the opposite sign. These two studies suggest that the 
effect on US income distribution of import competition from, and offshoring to, low-wage countries 
seems to be qualitatively different from the effect of high-wage countries. 
Ebenstein et al also find significant effects of import competition on employment reallocation, 
finding that the largest effect of globalization on low-skilled workers' income comes from movement 
from higher-wage industries to lower-wage ones. This parallels earlier findings by Bernard and Jensen 
(1999), who found that between-industry effects were a large component of increases in the average skill-
premium in the 1980's, although they were not able to pin down globalization as the cause. 
Ebenstein et al also find much stronger effects of offshore activities on domestic wages in the 
later part of the sample period, between 1997 through 2002. Occupation-specific changes in offshoring 
and trade are associated with significant wage effects, particularly for workers who are in routine 
occupations. For these workers, a 1 percentage point increase in low-income offshore affiliate 
employment is associated with a 0.11 percent fall in wages. For these same workers, however, increasing 
affiliate activity in high-income locations is associated with a 0.1 percent increase in wages. A 1 percent 
increase in export shares is associated with a 1 percent increase in wages while a 1 percent increase in 
import penetration is associated with a 0.46 percent decline in wages. The effects of these globalization 
measures are generally small in magnitude and insignificant for individuals who are in the least routine 
occupations. 
Ebenstein et al also find that the net impact of offshoring on wages is a function of the nature of 
the job: workers who perform more routine tasks have experienced wage declines as a result of 
offshoring, while workers who perform non-routine tasks have experienced wage increases. For routine 
occupations, which are more easily transferred offshore, the net effect on wages is negative but for the 
least routine (skilled) occupations, the net effects are positive. The last row of Figure 2 shows that the 
ratio of the wages of workers doing routine tasks to the wages of workers doing non-routine tasks 
declined precipitously between 1982 and 2005. The same is true of the ratio of the wages of less-educated 
workers to the wages of highly educated workers, confirming the high degree of negative correlation 
between the routineness of the task and workers' education. The first row of Figure 2 suggests that this 
increase in inequality is highly correlated with structural shifts in the American economy whereby 
workers left manufacturing and entered services. Recalling the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
model of Section 2.3.1, one might interpret these findings roughly as implying that the labor-supply effect 
of offshoring exceeds the productivity effect for the lower-skill workers who specialize in the more-
easily-offshored routine tasks. 20 
Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2010) analyze the relationship between offshoring and 
workers' wages and employment opportunities. They use a matched worker-firm data set that 
encompasses the Danish labor force from 1995-2006 as well as data set on offshoring at the firm level. 
They estimate the impact of exogenous shocks to offshoring and exporting on firm characteristics and on 
the wages of individual workers. Further, they assess the dependency of these estimates on the education 
and occupational characteristics of the workers so as to understand the relative sensitivity of types of 
workers and occupations to offshoring. They find that exogenous import shocks will have significant and 
opposite effects on skilled and unskilled labor wages: skilled labor wages will increase by 8.5 percent 
while unskilled labor wages will decrease by 7.3 percent. In contrast, shocks to exporting will increase 
both skilled and unskilled labor wages but low and medium skill workers will see a greater increase. 
The examination by Hummels et al of the role of occupational characteristics in wage inequality 
reveals that workers who are exposed to unsafe working conditions and workers in the natural sciences 
and engineering will see their wages fall in the case of offshoring shocks while those workers in the social 
sciences and language industries will be less affected by those shocks. 
Hummels et al also consider the relationship between displaced workers and offshoring, finding 
that those workers displaced by offshoring generally experience greater and more persistent wage and 
earnings loss than workers displaced for other reasons. While initially both low and high skill displaced 
workers experience wage loss, this loss is smaller and less persistent for high skill workers. A year after 
losing their jobs to offshoring, skilled workers will have lost 19 percent of their predisplacement earnings 
(which accounts for both lost hours and lowered wages once the worker has re-entered the workforce) as 
compared to the 28 percent loss experienced by unskilled workers. Additionally, Hummels et al find that 
it is essential to control for endogeniety of trade events in such an analysis. 
An additional firm-level study by Sethupathy (2009) shows that over the period in which the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, lowering costs of offshoring within 
North America, US firms that already offshored to Mexico significantly increased: (i) their offshoring to 
Mexico; (ii) their operating profits per US worker; and (iii) the wages they paid to their US workers - 
without, apparently, reducing their US workforce. This suggests that some of the productivity benefits of 
the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model have been realized by those firms, and benefitted those 
workers, but it should be noted that this finding does not imply any benefit to workers outside of those 
firms (unlike the Grossman/Rossi-Hansberg model). 
In sum, recalling the account in Section 2.3.1, there are two main stories that have emerged from 
the theoretical literature, first, that offshoring can raise wage inequality in both countries as in Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996); and second, that offshoring can raise the real wages of unskilled workers by 
enhancing their effective productivity, as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). These two predictions 
are distinct, but not mutually exclusive. There is now fairly strong evidence for the first story, the income-
distribution effect, from multiple data sets and approaches. The second story has done less well when 
confronted with data, at least when the focus is on offshoring to low-wage-countries.
4
3.4. Implicit Contracts 
 
Empirical tests of implicit-contract models with trade are rare. Bertrand (2004) points out that if implicit 
contracts are very effective, then a workers' wages will be affected by labor- market conditions such as 
local unemployment rates at the time the worker joined the firm, but not by subsequent labor-market 
conditions. The reason is that the worker and firm will bargain for their optimal implicit contract at the 
beginning of their relationship, at which point the current unemployment rate will have an effect on 
workers' bargaining power and hence on the wage agreed to; but if implicit contracts are strong and 
provide good insurance to the worker, for the remainder of the job, wages will simply follow the agreed-
upon wage regardless of subsequent labor-market conditions. She finds that (i) a workers' current wage is 
affected by initial conditions at the time of beginning of the job, independently of current labor-market 
                                                       
4It is worth noting that in the Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and Ebenstein et al (2009) papers, Mexico is not classified 
as a low-wage country. 21 
conditions; and (ii) in industries hit by a rise in import penetration, the current wage is much more 
dependent on the current labor-market conditions compared with other industries. Together, these 
findings suggest that (i) implicit contracts are important, and (ii) import competition indeed weakens 
them, as predicted by her model. 
3.5. Labor Market Frictions 
Krishna and Senses (2009) offer an empirical study of the impact of openness to trade on domestic 
income. Whereas previous studies examine the impact on wage growth, decrease, or the wage gap, 
Kirshna and Senses examine the impact on wage volatility. Using longitudinal earnings data on workers 
from three panels (spanning 1993-2003) of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, they 
estimate the relationship between labor income risk (defined as the "variance of unpredictable changes in 
earnings") and import penetration, a measure of industry exposure to international trade. They find that a 
10 percent increase in import penetration will increase the standard deviation in persistent (as opposed to 
transitory) income shocks by 20 to 25 percent for all workers. Their results are both statistically and 
economically significant. 
Krishna and Senses (2009) also estimate subsets of their data to identify the impact of openness to 
trade on particular industries and on workers who have changed employment from one industry to 
another; they find higher income risk among workers who have switched from one industry to another. 
Among those who switched, income risk was higher among those who moved to non-manufacturing 
sectors than those who switched within manufacturing sectors. In light of their findings, Krishna and 
Senses (2009) conclude that the impact on labor income risk needs to be taken into account when 
calculating the costs of openness to international trade. 
Robustness tests by Krishna and Senses (2009) reveal that controlling for offshoring causes the 
coefficient on import penetration to increase. In addition, the offshoring variable is negative and 
significant, suggesting that an increase in offshoring in a particular industry is associated with a decrease 
in income risk in that industry. 
Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) and Artug and McLaren (2010) estimate and simulate the 
dynamic model of labor adjustment developed in Cameron, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2007) and 
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) to assess the distributional effects of trade shocks. The former study uses 
the US CPS data and the latter uses 2004-2006 data from the Household Employment Survey of the 
Turkish Statistical Institute. The studies estimate both the average cost of switching industries and the 
variance of idiosyncratic switching costs, and use the estimates to simulate a trade shock to the 
manufacturing sector. In both cases, the authors find that, due to the high the costs of switching from one 
industry to another, the economy takes a decade to reach the new steady state after liberalization. During 
this time, workers move from the manufacturing sector to other sectors, wages in the manufacturing 
sector first drop then rise as labor supply to that sector falls, and wages in other sectors at first rise and 
then fall as labor supply to those sectors rises. However, throughout these fluctuations, the real wage of 
the manufacturing sector remains below that of the tariff steady state while the non-manufacturing sector 
real wage remains above it. 
Importantly, the distributional effects of the trade shock on lifetime expected utility are much 
smaller than the effects on wages, once each worker's future possible mobility and option value are taken 
into account. In particular, in many specifications import-competing workers' lifetime welfare rises 
despite a drop in their wages, because each manufacturing worker understands that there is a probability 
each year that she will choose to enter the expanding export sector and benefit from the increased real 
wages there. A dynamic approach with a full accounting of option value therefore complicates the welfare 
analysis of income inequality. For example, recall that Ebenstein et al (2009) have argued that large 
numbers of US workers have been pushed by offshoring to low-wage countries from high-wage 
manufacturing jobs into lower-wage service-sector jobs. In a dynamic model, these workers may 
nonetheless benefit from such offshoring, because each manufacturing worker knows that with some 
probability each year she will move into the service sector anyway; the value of this option is enhanced 
by any measure that raises the real wage in that sector.22 
4.  DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research in the 1990's undermined the simple Hecksher-Ohlin theory linking trade and inequality, and 
economists pointed at non-trade factors, such as technology and labor institutions or laws, to explain 
rising inequality. However, now a number of other channels have been discovered that have led to a 
vigorous resurgence of the idea that trade can lead to a rise in inequality - with the new features that it can 
do so through North-North trade; in countries of the South; and within each industry and within each class 
of workers. These theoretical developments have been in important respects fed by empirical work, and 
are now in turn giving rise to a rich new empirical literature, partly due to the increasing access to firm-
level data across an increasing range of countries. 
A number of natural directions for future work suggest themselves. The new ideas on consumer-
side effects (Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2009)) and on higher-dimensional income-inequality 
effects (Section 2.3.2) await empirical exploration, while the interactions of trade with imperfect 
contracting have had very little empirical attention. Most empirical work still focuses on the 
manufacturing sector, which for most countries covers a minority of the workforce, while major effects of 
globalization may make themselves felt in the remaining sectors (Ebenstein et al (2009)). Most work on 
inequality has been unable to work out whether real incomes have increased or fallen due to trade, as 
opposed to the variance of incomes, and it is still difficult to disentangle trade effects from technology 
shocks. There has been very little attention in theory or in the data to the effects of trade on income 
inequality across age categories (Artuc (2009)), and the empirical analysis of unemployment lags far 
behind the theory (Davidson and Matusz (2009)). All of these can usefully be placed on the agenda for 
the coming years. 
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